Now in my 70s, I am more and more intrigued with questions of memory. Often, when I get together with friends and former co-workers, we recall and rehash, as the old soldiers did in the decades after the Civil War, events from our past. Some of those events occurred nearly 50 years ago and you may be certain that our discussions are often lively, as we struggle to recall and reconstruct events we all participated in.

Last June, in a post you may read here, I looked at several postwar recollections from soldiers regarding the adoption of the Spencer carbine in their commands in May 1864. I selected the specific recollections I discussed because I had found contemporary records addressing those same events. I did not do so with the intention of denigrating the men involved but rather because I now have a better understanding of the challenges they faced. When I recently found a document written by Capt. Walter Robbins, 1^st New Jersey Cavalry, I saw another opportunity to compare what he wrote in the moment with his recollection of the same event years later.

Just 17 years old when he enlisted in an infantry unit, Robbins earned a commission in the 1^st New Jersey after impressing Col. Percy Wyndham during a boxing match. He ended the war as lieutenant colonel of the regiment, with a brevet rank of brigadier general. His memoir, War Record and Personal Experiences of Walter Raleigh Robbins: From April 22, 1861, to August 4, 1865, is a short engaging account of his service. The book was published in 1923, the same year Robbins died. Free digital downloads of the book became more difficult to find after a new print edition, titled Cavalry Commander, April 22, 1861, to August 4, 1865, appeared in 2019.

In his memoir, Robbins, who provides few dates for many of the events he describes, recalls being summoned by Gen. David Gregg, commanding the 3^rd Cavalry Division, in early June 1863.

“After the Stoneman Raid, General Gregg’s division was encamped near Bealton Station … Horses were being sent to [Aquia] Creek on the Potomac. General Gregg had sent an officer and a number of men to [Aquia] to be remounted. The other divisions had done the same thing, and were getting horses and remounting their men, but General Gregg’s division was not getting any. General Gregg sent for me, and told me the situation, and ordered me to take a detail, go to [Aquia], relieve the other officer, get the horses, remount the men, and then join the command. The order was not an agreeable one. I saluted, however, and was about to retire when the General said, ‘I think there will be no movement before you return.’

“‘I hope not, sir,’ I replied, again saluting.

“[Aquia] was forty miles away. I reached there the following morning…

“The first and second days after my arrival at [Aquia] I got no horses, though the other two divisions were getting them. I had a large number of dismounted men waiting for them. On the third day, as the transports arrived loaded with horses, I marched two hundred men down to the landing, and as the horses came off took possession of them. This raised a storm, and a big one too. I was even ordered under arrest, by a staff officer of General Pleasonton. As the general was forty miles away, I doubted his right to do this, so kept on with my duty as I saw it.

“The next day, three hundred men and horses started for General Gregg’s division; the fourth and fifth days I got no more horses. But the sixth day I marched another lot of men to the transport landing and secured three hundred more horses, this time with little trouble.

“The next day we found that General Hooker…was moving from the Rappahannock River… toward Bull Run… [Returning, Robbins reached the division] to find that it had been heavily engaged the day before at Brandy Station…

With his postwar account as a starting point, let me flesh out some of the missing details.

Robbins tells us that General Gregg had previously sent another unnamed officer and an unspecified number of dismounted men from the division back to the supply depot at Aquia Landing to receive fresh horses. As suggested by the following communications, I believe the unnamed officer was Lt. Charles McKinstry, then the assistant regimental quartermaster for the 1^st New Jersey. McKinstry later served as the regimental adjutant.

On June 1, McKinstry contacted Gregg, stating, “I…called at Lt. Col. Sawtelle’s office this evening, but did not see that gentleman, he being absent a few days. I saw Lt. Spangler, however, who is acting in his stead and [I] represented our want of [horses], as directed… He would not give me an order to secure all the horses as they arrive and stated that Gen. Pleasonton had ordered Capt. Brown to divide them equally between the 2^nd and 3^rd Cavalry Divisions. None are here at present although they are daily expected.”

Lt. Col. Charles Sawtelle had served as General Stoneman’s chief quartermaster and Lt. John Spangler, 6^th New York Cavalry, had served as Pleasonton’s quartermaster when Pleasonton commanded the 1^st Division in the spring of 1863. When Pleasonton took command of the Cavalry Corps, Sawtelle moved to army headquarters as assistant chief quartermaster under Gen. Rufus Ingalls and Spangler moved up to corps headquarters. I believe the Capt. Brown mentioned by McKinstry is Capt. William Henry Brown, who had first enlisted as a private in the 2^nd U.S. Cavalry in 1858. After working his way up to sergeant, Brown received a commission as a lieutenant and served the remainder of the war as a quartermaster. He mustered out in 1865 as a captain, having received several brevets for gallantry.

On June 2, Spangler told Brown, “Lt. McKinstry of the 1^st NJ Cavalry will report to you this evening to receive the horses for the 3^rd Cavalry Division.” On the same day, General Gregg issued Special Order 16, stating, “Capt. Robbins, 1^st New Jersey Cavalry will at once proceed to Aquia Creek Landing to receive horses for this division. On his arrival at Aquia, Capt. Robbins will report to Capt. Brown.” Gregg’s order gives us a starting date of June 2 for Robbins’s travails. 

Robbins tells us that he received no horses the first two days after reaching Aquia, but on the third day he “marched two hundred men down to the landing, and as the horses came off took possession of them.” Men and officers who can acquire [my emphasis in both cases] anything for their men in the face of all opposition are the stuff legend in the military, but one can also understand the problems such men can cause by acting against the rules and without orders. In Robbins’s case, he tells us that he was “ordered under arrest, by a staff officer of General Pleasonton.” The staff officer is almost certainly Lieutenant Spangler.

Robbins continues, writing, “The next day [again no dates] three hundred horses and men started for General Gregg’s division.” Robbins received no horses over the next two days but “secured three hundred more” presumably on the sixth day and returned to the division. By his count, Robbins had acquired at least 600 horses and maybe 800.

I have discussed on this site, as well as in my book Small but Important Riots, the critical need for horses on the eve of Brandy Station. But actual numbers are elusive and, of course, changed daily, as fresh remounts arrived and exhausted horses gave out. Put another way, I do not think the Cavalry Corps, or any cavalry command, ever ‘caught up’ and put every man in the saddle. On May 14, Colonel Wyndham’s Brigade, which included the 1^st New Jersey, counted 93 officers and 1418 enlisted men. Wyndham reported 1,073 horses and 440 unserviceable horses for the enlisted men. The report specifies the smaller figure as unserviceable but does not define whether the larger figure represents total horses for the enlisted men or total serviceable horses for the enlisted men. I believe it is probably the latter.

The same chart reflects 28 officers and 364 men in the 1^st New Jersey, along with 62 officer horses, 155 serviceable horses for the men and 134 unserviceable horses. The 1^st Maryland, which Robbins refers to later, included 22 officers and 387 men, with 40 officer horses, 343 serviceable horses for the men and 218 unserviceable. Officer horses really do not count when considering the shortage within the corps, as officers provided their own animals.  Discounting the officers and only looking at two of the four regiments in the brigade gives us, I think, a fair understanding of the problem.

These figures could have changed substantially by June 2, when Robbins received his orders from Gregg, but trying to a more accurate figure for the June 2 time frame is probably impossible. Other forms, required to be completed daily, are available for the late-winter and early-spring time frame and they document the near constant gain and loss of animals. Unfortunately, these forms appear to have been required only during long periods of relative inactivity, such as winter encampments. I will look at some of these in a later post. But as I have said in the past, any available strength figures given in the Official Records or elsewhere are a mirage and changed almost minute by minute.

In a letter just written after Brandy Station, a member of the 1^st New Jersey gave the strength of the regiment on June 9 as 22 officers and 231 men. In another letter, written just after the battle, the adjutant counts 21 officers and either 234 or 284 men. The regimental historian, Henry Pyne, counted 259 enlisted men in the ranks that day. The only thing I believe we can be sure of is that the Cavalry Corps was desperately short of horses on the eve of the battle, such that the addition of two infantry brigades only brought the corps up to near parity with Jeb Stuart’s division.

For a little more on remount concerns please watch my friends Steve and Brandon from the Research Arsenal and their 11^th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry channel here.

So, what did Captain Robbins report at the time? On June 6, he wrote the following report to one of General Gregg’s aides.

“I have received 60 horses since Major Boothby left. This Morning Capt. Brown refused to issue any more to me at present. He said that he had received orders to issue the horses equally to the four cavalry divisions. I was there all day endeavoring to secure the horses that are now there but failed to do so. I shall try again in the morning. I have secured all the horses that have come up today, which Capt. Brown informs me are three times my share.

“I went to headquarters this pm to see Lt. Spangler, he was not there. If Capt. Brown refuses to let me have horses in the morning, I will see Lt. Spangler and as things are so mixed up, perhaps I can get an order from him for them.

“Col. [Arno] Voss is here with the 12^th IL. He wished me to turn over what horses I have to him, also those that I may draw. From what I can learn from him, he has received permission to remain here and equip his regt. I shall not let him have the horses till I receive orders from the Gen’l to that effect.

“There were a good many of the Maryland men took horses from the line and went with Maj. Boothby’s command, which were not counted. There were also some of Maj. Boothby’s command left their old horses in the woods. These were not counted.”

All in all, I think his report to Gregg compares well with his recollection many years later. Major Boothby is Maj. Stephen Boothby, 1^st Maine, who may have been there on the same mission for Gregg’s 1^st Brigade. Robbins mentions four cavalry divisions. He meant three divisions and Gen. John Buford’s Reserve Brigade. His references to Lieutenant Spangler and Captain Brown do not seem confrontational enough to justify placing Robbins under arrest, though both Spangler and Brown must have been both exhausted and fed up with a seemingly endless line of men demanding horses and equipment, both of which were in very short supply. Tempers must have been short.

Finally, Robbins mentions the 1^st Maryland at the end of his report. On June 6, the day Robbins wrote his report, Lt. Col. James Deems, commanding the 1^st Maryland wrote:

“I…request to inform [Col. Wyndham] of the fact that amongst the horses received yesterday one has been found bearing marks which indicate the horse as having belonged to the 10^th New York Cavalry.  The men that brought the horses from the station [were from] the 10^th New York regiment and have evidently exchanged their horses for better ones in the lot.

“I am desirous of having the attention of Col. [Wyndham] called to this, in order to receive if possible the horses which should have been brought to this regiment and to prevent difficulties in the future.”

One gets the sense of a rather furious free for all, in which every man and officer took it upon himself to acquire as many horses as possible through whatever means possible, including by surreptitiously exchanging their own worn-out animals for any horse deemed to be in better condition.

Sources:

Documents at the National Archives

Chicago Tribune

Newark Daily Advertiser

Trenton State Gazette

Francis Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the U.S. Army

Roger Hunt, Brevet Brigadier Generals in Blue

Henry Pyne, Ride to War, The History of the 1^st New Jersey Cavalry

Walter Robbins, Cavalry Commander, April 22, 1861, to August 4, 1865

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