On the quarterly ordnance return for March 30, 1863, the men of the 18^th Pennsylvania Cavalry reported carrying the Merrill carbine exclusively; 555 Merrills in nine companies. On the June 30 report, the men carried 337 Burnside carbines and only Burnsides. On the September 30 return, the men of 11 companies reported carrying 528 Burnsides and only Burnsides. To be clear, the men carried sabers and, eventually, revolvers in addition to their carbines but my focus here is on their carbines.

By way of comparison, the men of the 17^th Pennsylvania counted 256 carbines from four different manufacturers on the September 30 report, including Burnsides, Merrills, Sharps and Smiths. The men of five companies carried two different weapons, all of which made for a logistical headache. The end of the year report notes the same mix of weapons in the 17^th Pennsylvania, with the addition of several Starr carbines, while the 18^th Pennsylvania again reported only Burnsides.

At the end of June 1864, the 17^th Pennsylvania had begun to carry the Sharps almost exclusively, with only five odd weapons of two other makes reported, while the 18^th Pennsylvania still counted only Burnsides. Three months later, the 18^th Pennsylvania reported 325 Spencer Carbines and 31 Burnsides. The 17^th Pennsylvania still carried carbines from five manufacturers, though the Sharps predominated.

You will easily find these Quarterly Ordnance Returns on the highly recommended Research Arsenal site here.

By now, you might be asking, where are these facts and figures taking us?

Years ago, while working on my book Chasing Jeb Stuart and John Mosby, I discussed a comment in the regimental history for the 18^th Pennsylvania Cavalry with the late Horace Mewborn. Horace was, and I believe remains, the pre-eminent Mosby historian. The men of the 18^th Pennsylvania had been victimized, if not embarrassed, by Mosby and his men several times and thus the following entry in the regimental itinerary seemed significant.

The June 21, 1863, entry reads, “‘Burnside’ carbines issued to regiment. This is a poor arm but superior to the ‘Merrill,’ which we now discard.” Following the issue of the new weapons the regiment, along with the other regiments of Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel’s cavalry division left Fairfax Court House on a reconnaissance, all the while listening to the guns at Upperville.

The notation seemed noteworthy for several reasons, including the timing, with the Gettysburg Campaign already well underway. In my experience, a regiment completely swapping out a particular make of carbine for another in one day is rare. Also, the overt criticism of both weapons seemed significant, but what had led to the change? We had few answers, though we both felt there must have been more to the story. Over time, I have had reason to return to and re-examine our questions and our discussion. Several considerations slowly revealed themselves, but the answer remained elusive until a recent visit to the archives.

In the spring of 1863, General Stahel received priority over General Pleasonton’s Cavalry Corps for horses, as Stahel rather than Pleasonton had been tasked with protecting the nation’s capital against an anticipated raid on the city by Jeb Stuart’s Southern cavalry (See Chasing Jeb Stuart and John Mosby for more on the ‘raid.’ Might Stahel also have received priority for better weapons?

Years later, and while working on the new edition of Small but Important Riots, I spent a lot of time looking through ordnance records. Rather than looking through the extensive records for the Ordnance Department specifically, however, I examined thousands of telegrams from ordnance officers stationed either at department headquarters in Washington or the Washington Arsenal, as well as those posted with the Army of the Potomac, and specifically the Cavalry Corps, as well as at arsenals around the country. Most of these telegrams consist of one or two sentences and may seem like useless minutia at first glance but by compiling them chronologically answers often reveal themselves.

The time spent with these records resulted, in part, in the third appendix in Small but Important Riots, titled Horses, Ordnance, and Regimental Strength. But as Stahel’s division did not play a role in the Loudoun Valley fighting, I did not include anything related to his division or the 18^th Pennsylvania specifically. Then, earlier this year, I began looking at the extensive records for the Ordnance Department. Though I will never get through the collection, I did find the answer as to why the men of the 18^th Pennsylvanian exchanged their Merrills for Burnsides on June 21, 1863. But first, let us look at some other information regarding the Merrill Carbine.

On June 12, 1863, General James Ripley, Chief of the Ordnance Department, ordered a subordinate in New York to send 1,000 “Burnside carbines to the Washington Arsenal at once by railroad.” The same day, with demands for carbines escalating throughout the army, Ripley told Gen. John Buford’s ordnance officer, “Have no Sharps carbines but will send the best on hand.”

Three days later, Ripley told his subordinate at department headquarters, “Please inform Gen. Pleasonton that the Dept. has no Sharps carbines and that you will issue to him Burnside carbines … 1000 having been ordered from New York by Railroad.”

The next day, Stahel wrote to Ripley, asking that his “order for…500 Sharps Carbines … for the 18^th Penn Cavalry be filled with the Burnside Carbine of which there are plenty on hand at the Washington Arsenal.” How Stahel knew this is unstated, though he added, “The regiment is in great need of some carbine and there is little hope of the order being filled in the same time with the Sharps Carbine.” An officer at the arsenal told Stahel, “Burnside carbines will be issued … with ammunition and forwarded by the first train tomorrow morning. Only 500 Burnside carbines on hand.” Unstated is where these weapons had come from. Had they just arrived in the shipment from New York or were they the last Burnsides in the Washington Arsenal? Two days later, the men of the 18^th Pennsylvania swapped their Merrills for Burnsides.

These telegrams help us track the process but do not tell us anything regarding the reason or reasons leading to the exchange. The included information is important for other reasons, however. First, the messages confirm the seriousness with which the War Department viewed the rumors of a Southern cavalry raid on Washington. In mid-June, Stahel, not Pleasonton, received priority not just for horses but also for weapons.

The information also confirms that neither the War Department nor the Ordnance Department had a magical horn of plenty that never ran out of the best equipment or weapons. On the eve of the fighting at Gettysburg, the arsenals around Washington had exhausted their stocks of carbines. In other words, men who lost or damaged their weapon in battle would not receive another in a timely manner.

But Stahel’s assertion, that “the regiment is in great need of some carbine,” is misleading, as we know the Pennsylvanians carried Merrills. Is he hinting at a problem with their weapons?

In his study Civil War Carbines, Myth vs. Reality, author Peter Schiffers discusses eleven carbines used by the Northern cavalry during the war. He examines strengths and weaknesses of each and offers observations and comparisons of the weapons based upon his use of those in his collection. In his view, the Merrill, “at least technically speaking, is one of the most attractive shoulder weapons of the Civil War,” but is he damning the carbine with faint praise? In other words, what might be more important to a soldier, the attractiveness of their weapon or the reliability of their weapon?

Schiffers also includes comments, pro and con, from men who used the weapon, and he refers to questionnaires sent to the men in the summer of 1863. He tells us that negative comments prevailed, with one survey showing 52% negative comments and the second 65% negative. He tallies and briefly discusses eight weaknesses reported, including an inability to make repairs in the field, fragility of the mechanism, broken stocks, barrels bursting, and heavy fouling. He does not link any of these complaints, however, directly to my question – what led to the Burnside replacing the Merrill on June 21, 1863.

Having looked briefly at the weapon in question, let us look at the regiment involved. Organized in the fall of 1862, the 18^th Pennsylvania left for Washington on December 8, 1862. Attached to the Defenses of Washington, the men had barely settled into camp before being sent across the Potomac River to Arlington and then Alexandria, Virginia. On January 8, 1863, the men moved to the picket lines near Fairfax Court House, where they soon encountered John Mosby and his then small force of guerrillas.

Worthy of note here, is that, as we will see below, most of the men only received their Merrill carbines on January 13 or 15, after they had been on the picket line for several days and having already made a reconnaissance to the Blue Ridge Mountains. Still, a few men had received the weapons earlier, and some defect may already have been revealed. As one trooper explained on January 9, “one hundred well drilled and armed rebel cavalry could have taken our [whole] regiment prisoners, [as we] had nothing but our old sabers and twenty carbines to a company. We had no ammunition.” So, the regiment apparently received enough carbines to arm 20 men per company prior to January 9 and the remainder a week later. Missing from the accounts is any indication that the men ever drilled or practiced with their weapons or had received any instruction before taking the field.

At the same time, the army was desperately trying to acquire large numbers of carbines to arm the thousands of men entering the mounted force. On November 6, 1862, the officer then commanding the Ordnance Department instructed a subordinate to examine 1,300 Merrill carbines, report upon their quality and suggest what he thought the government should pay for them. Two weeks later, General Ripley contacted the owners of the company, telling them that the weapons ordered three days earlier “must all be got off with the utmost dispatch.” I do not know if any of these 1,300 carbines went to the Pennsylvanians, though the timing suggests they might have. More importantly, the correspondence hints at the need to get weapons into the field quickly and such demands often lead to shortcuts in the production process, which, in turn, might have led to the deficiencies cited by Peter Schiffers.

On February 1, 1863, John Mosby attacked a picket post, manned by the 18^th Pennsylvania, along Lawyer’s Road in northwestern Fairfax County. The Southerners captured the entire force, except for one man, who they killed attempting to flee.

At the end of the month, Mosby again targeted the Pennsylvanians, in the same vicinity. Most of the Yankees were apparently sleeping in a log building or buildings when the attack occurred. An alert sentinel snapped off a hasty shot, which roused the men. Stumbling outside, the men fired a few random shots, before taking to the woods to escape the Southern attack.

In a letter written two days afterwards, a member of the regiment, who reached the scene with a relief force, noted that 44 men had manned the post. The trooper found “quite a number of sabers and carbines” left behind. After speaking with the owner of the property, the soldier explained that when the men tried to form a battle line to meet the Southern attack, “there was but few carbines that went off.” Having been roused from their sleep to meet the enemy for maybe only the second time, and doing so in the dark, the untried troopers may have failed to seat their percussion caps properly. Not doing so would explain why the weapons did not fire. But the writer blamed the weapons, terming them “poor things,” and claimed the men had no faith in them. The Southerners apparently had no regard for the weapons either, as they left them on the field.

What should we make of these two incidents and the information provided by the trooper above? Do we dismiss the Federals as poorly trained cowards, or do we credit John Mosby’s brilliance as a guerrilla fighter? Here is where the story has rested for 161 years, until another reason revealed itself in the ordnance records, and, as we will see, answers our original question regarding the exchange of weapons on June 21.

About halfway between the two skirmishes, Col. Timothy Bryan, commanding the regiment, ordered Maj. William Darlington to inspect the carbines and sabers carried by the men. Darlington filed his report on February 19. He counted 623 Merrills, with 548 serviceable and 75 unserviceable.

“Many of the carbines returned unserviceable are rendered so by bursting [Darlington’s emphasis], either near the breech or in the barrel near the muzzle. The burstings have become so frequent as to make many of the men timid and they fire their pieces very reluctantly. I have examined several of the burst carbines and in every instance detected flaws in the metal.”

Major Darlington then examined the sabers issued to the men. He counted 688, with 67 unusable.

“Those returned as serviceable are, at best, a very inferior article, being both too short and light – bending very easily and remaining bent. They will answer very well for drilling new recruits but, in my opinion, are totally unfit for actual service.

“There are no pistols, and I respectfully suggest the propriety of an effort being made to secure the requisite number. They would tend vastly to assure our men and give them more confidence.”

In endorsing Darlington’s report, Gen. Samuel Heintzelman, commanding the Defenses of Washington, wrote, “…A portion of the arms have been inspected by Lieut. Col. [Solon] Lathrop, Asst, Inspector General and by Capt. [Wesley] Merritt, an officer of the cavalry. The carbines are as bad as are represented…”

General Heintzelman apparently sent the report to the office of the Secretary of War, where Asst. Sec. of War Peter Watson noted, “… the Chief of Ordnance will need a competent officer to examine these arms and report their precise condition at the present time and the causes of their unserviceableness. Such carbines as have burst barrels, as well as the inspecting officer, send immediately to the Washington Arsenal, that the cause of bursting may be ascertained.” The report moved quickly as both Heintzelman and Watson endorsed it on February 28, just three days after the fight at Thompson’s Corner.

On the same day, February 28 (The exact order of events is unknown), Col. R. Butler Price, Colonel Bryan’s brigade commander, sent the following letter to Lathrop.

“Col. Bryan desires that the arms of his regiment be inspected. He represents his carbines (Merrills) as very defective, dangerous only to those who use them; thirty-five having burst at the second or third discharge. His sabres are much lighter than those generally used, shorter and imperfectly fastened to the hilt, the quality of the metal such, that in bending it at any angle, even 90 degrees, it will remain in that position. His pistols are of Colts pattern, good but he has but 47 for his whole command. Col. Bryan’s regiment, the 18^th Penn, is on duty in front of Fairfax and certainly needs good arms.”

Interestingly, Colonel Price mentions some pistols in the regiment, where Major Darlington mentions none, though I suspect the pistols had been assigned to the officers.

In response to Asst. Sec. of War Watson’s directive, General Ripley sent Lt. Thomas Treadwell to inspect the carbines. In his report of March 7, Treadwell explained:

“…The regiment is upwards of 800 strong … have been in service about six months and are armed … with the Merrill & Thomas Carbine. All have sabres.

“I first made a careful inspection of the carbines and found 10 of them [burst] near the muzzle, one at the breech, one through the cone seat, and Major Darlington told me he had sent about as many more burst carbines to Washington – 25 of the stocks were split (the wood of the stocks seems to be badly seasoned, some of them having shrunk from the iron work and others soft and abraded by rubbing against the saddle. The sabres were issued the 23^rd of Dec., and the carbines 13 January from the Washington Arsenal. I examined the burst arms very carefully and am of the opinion the barrels are of very poor material and judge they have never been [proven]. Certainly not one of the carbines should have burst with its small charge and light ball.

“A sergeant told me his carbine burst the second time he fired it. I questioned the men closely as to the circumstances of the bursting and they were confident that in no case was there more than a single cartridge used … they have no tompions [a plug or cover to protect the barrel from dirt and rain, etc.]. I do not think that the bursting could be due to carelessness (in my opinion a good carbine ought to resist double charges or even with a tompion left in the muzzle at the time of discharge.)

“At the muzzle where most of the carbines burst, the metal around the opening – which was generally an irregular slit from an inch to two inches long – was much bulged out. In some cases, there were several openings – the metal about the puncture seemed to be of poor quality.

“In my opinion these carbines are unserviceable and the large number that have burst during their short service has destroyed the confidence of the men in their arms. I…recommend [they be] exchanged as soon as possible and neither these or any other carbines of this manufacture be issued, until the barrels have been fully proven, and that no more of these arms be purchased.

“The sabres are a mixed lot – in each company were a few of American manufacture. Of these I noticed these varieties viz Hammond, [Sheeble & Fisher] of [Philadelphia]., and Ames of Chicopee. The most, however, were of foreign make, of these six kinds, some heavy, others very light, and all of poor quality – very soft. I could bend most of them at pleasure by hand, taking the hilt in one hand and near the point in the other, and they remained permanently set, without elasticity. Most of them are iron. They are not serviceable. I recommend them to be turned in and others issued, except the few [of] American make which are good.

“Two companies that have joined recently have no carbines but are armed with good sabres … The regiment has no pistols and if impracticable to issue carbines it might be well to furnish pistols. The regiment is advanced to the front doing picket duty and close to the enemy and I think reliable carbines for at least two companies should be issued to them to be used on this duty.”

On April 3, 1863, General Ripley told a subordinate in New York, “The Merrill carbines should be proved in such a way as to satisfy you of their entire fitness for the service.” Ripley may not have approved any further contracts, however, as the Merrill’s soon began disappearing, being exchanged for more reliable weapons. By September fewer than 3,000 Merrills remained in service throughout the Union armies. Fourteen months later, Federal arsenals held fewer than 1,000 and the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, reported none in service. By the end of the war, fewer than 500 appear on army inventories.

Other questions remain. When did the men first learn of the problem with the barrels. More importantly, when did men first see a barrel burst? If they had not practiced with the weapons, they probably experienced the problem for the first time in combat, during the skirmishes with John Mosby. Imagine the shock of having a barrel burst inches from your face, especially at night. Bursting at the muzzle would be scary enough but an explosion at the cone or the breach might have resulted in a disfiguring injury to the man’s face, or death. Seeing or hearing of several weapons bursting must have been truly disconcerting, especially to untried soldiers. A choice of blindness, other injury or death versus capture and almost immediate parole seems like an easy choice.

And, had the weapons misfired due to carelessness during the encounters with Mosby or, based on what we now know, might a defect in the weapons have caused the reported misfires? Considering these questions in total, we should ask, had Mosby defeated the men or had they been defeated by their weapons?

Only one casualty (killed or wounded) can be identified from these two affairs, the man killed trying to escape during the first skirmish. But more than 100 men, listed in the regimental roster as killed, wounded, or captured during the war, have no information beyond their name as to when and where the casualty occurred.  Though the lack of identifying information makes follow-up difficult, a personal account in a letter or pension application could prove enlightening.

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Sources:

Documents in the National Archives

The Research Arsenal

Diary of Hugh St. Clair, AHEC.

William Martin Letters, Harrisburg CWRT Collection, AHEC

Frederick Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion

Hugh Keen and Horace Mewborn, 43^rd Battalion Virginia Cavalry, Mosby’s Command

John McAulay, Carbines of the U.S. Cavalry, 1861-1865

O’Neill, Chasing Jeb Stuart and John Mosby, The Union Cavalry in Northern Virginia from Second Manassas to Gettysburg.

Peter Schiffers, Civil War Carbines, Myth vs. Realty

Publication Committee, History of the Eighteenth Regiment of Cavalry Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1909