Rather than discussing the actual battle of Kelly’s Ford, I want to look at events leading up to the battle. Most of the documents I cite do not appear in The Official Records, though a couple are quoted in Edwin Fishel’s excellent work, The Secret War for the Union, The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War.
And, no, you will not find any mention, beyond this sentence, of the oft-quoted note Confederate general Fitz Lee left for William Averell following the fight at Hartwood Church on February 25, 1863, and often cited as the impetus for the affair.
I also ask your indulgence, as I have interrupted my series on Inspectors and Veterinary Surgeons, which will resume next month.
For my thoughts on events preceding and following the fight at Hartwood Church see my posts from 2021 here and here. In the second link, I mention Gen. Joseph Hooker’s tirade in the wake of the defeat. The date of the event is uncertain, and the identify of his victim(s) is unclear, though George Stoneman, commander of the Cavalry Corps, and William Averell, whose division bore responsibility for the picket line around the church, are the likely candidates. I discuss those events in the posts linked above, but I want to take the story further here and look at subsequent events leading to the Kelly’s Ford fight a couple of weeks later.
Orders from Stoneman and Averell dated March 6, tend to fix the date of Hooker’s confrontation with one of or both of them as either March 5 or 6. Stoneman wrote, in part, “The fact of any party of men in the performance of outpost duty having been surprised and captured manifests a disregard for orders and a criminal neglect of duty for which no punishment can be too severe. Hereafter any commissioned officers or officers in command of a party engaged on scouting, outpost or picket duty who shall be surprised and any of the party under his or their command taken prisoner will be recommended for dismissal, the non-commissioned officers will be reduced to the ranks and together with the other enlisted men of the party surprised will be charged on their next muster roll with all public property with which they have been entrusted and which shall have been captured by the enemy.”
Averell issued a similar edict, stating, “The arms and equipments of those enlisted men and all government property in the possession of the officers who surrendered to the enemy without being wounded in the recent skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry will be charged against them on their next muster role… The spectacle of men with superior arms and equipment enlisted in the just cause yielding themselves prisoners unresistingly, without a struggle to a gang of yelling rebels, with old shotguns and horse pistols, is too revolting to contemplate… the officers and men of this Division must come to the understanding that it is their business to fight and if necessary die wherever they meet the enemy…” Averell issued a follow-up order on March 11, in which he extended these penalties to include the cost of their horses and horse equipment. At this point in the war, a cavalry horse might cost the government $100 to $125. Add in the cost of arms and other equipment and then consider the financial burden to a private trying to provide for his needs with the army, as well as his dependents back home. I believe the men quickly got the intended message.
By March 11, Stoneman had received permission to, in modern military parlance, ‘stand down’ his troopers, “for the purposes of resting, recruiting and disciplining” them, forcing the infantry to assume primary responsibility for much of the picket line around the army. On the same day, Hooker received a troubling intelligence report as to enemy intentions. Union scout John Howard Skinker, a slaveholder who lived in Stafford County and whose brother served in the Confederate army, reported information he had gleaned over the preceding days. Most concerning was his report that elements of Stuart’s cavalry intended to make a dash against the famous ‘cornstalks and beanpoles’ railroad bridge over Potomac Creek, in Stafford County. Skinker further stated his belief that a second mounted force, led by Jeb Stuart, was moving into the Shenandoah Valley. In total, these reports, as well as other information from Skinker, suggested that Robert E. Lee may have had an early spring campaign in mind.
One of Skinker’s superiors in the Bureau of Military Information gave the report further credence by passing it up the line. In doing so, he highlighted Skinker’s report that an unknown force of Southern cavalry had crossed the Rappahannock River on March 7, moved through a gap in the Union picket line and scouted routes across Stafford County, intent on “[ascertaining the] position of pickets in direction of Railroad Bridge across Potomac Run upon which point they contemplate a raid.”
Skinker had also reported that “Stonewall Jackson’s command, estimated at from twenty-eight to thirty-five thousand, and two brigades of cavalry under Generals Fitzhugh Lee, and [Wade] Hampton” lingered along the Rappahannock River near Fredericksburg. Time proved much of what Skinker reported to be incorrect, but Hooker could not ignore the reports. The ‘stand down’ for the cavalry ended before it truly began, when Hooker’s adjutant notified Stoneman of the possible raid against the railroad bridge and warned him that in the event the report proved correct “not a man or horse of the enemy” should escape.
The following day, March 12, Hooker’s chief of staff ordered Stoneman to “send out a force to make a reconnaissance to Kelly’s Ford and the intermediate fords between that and our lines; that the force be one merely for observation and knowledge of what movements the enemy may be making in those neighborhoods. One regiment, properly commanded, ought to accomplish this. That the force leave at daylight tomorrow; that means be taken to secure prompt and correct information from them, and that such information be reported here immediately upon [return].” Capt. George Gordon’s 2nd U.S. Cavalry drew the assignment.
Hooker also ordered the head of his Signal Corps to “watch the enemy very closely & report any changes or movements of any kind you may notice.” Lastly, he directed Thaddeus Lowe, with the Balloon Corps to “make frequent ascensions during the day, moving your balloon from right to left near the river. He desires that you make very close observations of the enemy, noticing any movements or work going on, or changes made – watch and note very carefully the fords & all along the river bank.”
Even as he looked to counter the Southern threats, Hooker began finalizing plans for his own spring campaign. To do so, he needed an accurate report from each of his subordinates as to the current state of their commands, as well as their needs and an estimate of “the least possible time required ‘to put [their] command in effective field condition.’”
Averell responded on March 12, with a rather wide-ranging and enlightening letter, especially in terms of his horses when considered against the events which soon followed. He cited “the need of 1,480 horses to mount my command.” He then explained that all the unserviceable horses were undergoing “a rigid inspection…to determine the number that shall be condemned. The time necessary to put my command in effective field condition will depend upon the supply of horses, to a great extent.”
During the winter encampments of 1862-63 and 1863-64, the army required daily reports from cavalry commanders at the regiment, brigade and division level, reporting the status of men and horses, the number of men on picket duty, the number on patrol duty, etc. Several of these reports have been found for March 16, when Averell’s Kelly’s Ford expedition left camp. Captain Gordon, reporting for the Reserve Brigade, deemed the condition of his horses as “poor,” but he did not give an overall strength of the brigade. General Pleasonton, commanding the 1st Division counted just 900 men for duty in his 1st Brigade and 803 men for duty in two regiments in his 2nd Brigade. He described the condition of the 1st Brigade horses as “poor,” and explained that the 8th Pennsylvania, in his 2nd Brigade, had no men available for duty due to a need for equipment and horses. Otherwise, he deemed the horses in his second Brigade to be in “good condition.” General Gregg, commanding the 3rd Division, tallied 850 men available in his 1st Brigade and 2197 in his 2nd Brigade, but only 1660 horses available and 681 animals deemed unserviceable. Though I have not found the report for Averell’s 2nd Division, a couple regimental reports have been found for March 15. On that day, the 4th Pennsylvania sent 15 officers and 300 men out for picket duty, leaving just 3 officers and 178 men available for other duty. On the day of the battle, however, the commander counted just 97 enlisted men for duty. The commander deemed his horses as “tolerable.”
Also on the 15th, Averell counted 2972 men in his division, with “489 men absent on leave or 430 more than allowed.” Considering that five days before the fight, half of the men in Averell’s division needed a horse, one might wonder just how effective his 2nd Division could be in the immediate future.
The first mention of the Kelly’s Ford expedition I have seen is dated March 13, when Hooker’s adjutant told John Buford, in temporary command of the Cavalry Corps, “to get in a state of preparation, a force of 2,500 to 3,000 cavalry, for an expedition to be absent three or four days with a section or ½ battery. It is desired that the object of this preparation shall not be made known; but be conducted as quickly and secretly as possible.” Hooker initially asked for 6,000 to 7,000 men. His adjutant then crossed out those figures and added 2,500 to 3,000 instead.
The same day, March 13, John Skinker sent in another intelligence report, stating in part, “The Headquarters of the cavalry, under [Fiz] Lee & Hampton are at Culpepper CH. A very large proportion of Hampton’s and a smaller proportion of Lee’s horses are worn out by too much use and scarcity of forage and have been sent back to the county of Albemarle to be recruited. (I hope this fact will cause no abatement of energy or watchfulness on the part of those in charge of the picket lines, especially in the neighborhood of Dumfries, Occoquan & above) Many of Hampton’s men, who know all this country well have been sent over as spies & infantry scouts, and should be carefully looked after…” Skinker’s report focused Hooker’s concern toward Culpeper County.
On March 14, Captain Gordon, 2nd U.S., returned from his reconnaissance. “…I … [proceeded] to Kelly’s Ford and [examined] all the intermediate Fords: there are small pickets of Infantry and cavalry at U.S. Ford, Richardson’s Ford and Ellis’ Ford: no indications of the enemy having crossed lately or making any preparations to cross now. At Kelly’s Ford there was a large picket of Infantry, saw no cavalry. I am confident that the enemy are not across the river in any considerable force. They have small scouts on this side who from their knowledge of the Country and the information received from the country people make it almost an impossibility to capture them. I returned within the line of pickets this morning…”
The same day a report came in from Ernest Yager, another Union scout formerly employed by Gen. Samual Heintzelman before being sent to Hooker. In part, Yager reported “quite a large [enemy] force near Warrenton,” in Fauquier County. Yager also noted enemy cavalry, along with a piece of artillery, in the vicinity of Brentsville, in Prince William County. The area of concern continued to expand, even as Hooker focused on Kelly’s Ford and Culpeper. Which brings me to a final point – Col. Percy Wyndham.
Colonel Wyndham commanded a cavalry brigade in General Heintzelman’s Department of Washington and made his headquarters at Fairfax Court House. Readers will recall that John Mosby’s main purpose in raiding Fairfax Court House on March 9 had been to capture Wyndham. Fortuitously in Washington at the time, Wyndham escaped and Mosby settled for Gen. Edwin Stoughton.
When I wrote Chasing Jeb Stuart and John Mosby, I believed that Mosby’s raid had been the impetus that brought the Michigan Cavalry Brigade from Washington to Fairfax. Communications found subsequently, including the following from Wyndham, suggest the raid was only one factor in the decision to move the brigade to Fairfax. On March 14, Wyndham, back at Fairfax Court House, told Heintzelman, “It would be well to have the Mich. Cavalry here as if the report is true we can operate on their flanks & rear. It is very possible that the enemy have passed up the Luray Valley and will go through one of the gaps in the Blue Ridge & come in on the flanks of our forces at Winchester.” Wyndham is referring to Skinker’s reports that Stuart was leading a force into the Shenandoah Valley. Though strapped for men, Wyndham sent a follow-up, advising “I will have my whole command saddled & ready to move in any direction from which the enemy may attack.” Wyndham’s messages suggest to me, that Heintzelman was receiving the intelligence reports from Hooker’s Bureau of Military Information and sharing them with his commanders.
In Chasing Jeb Stuart and John Mosby, I also credited Wyndham with initiating the plan, at least in part, that led to the fight at Kelly’s Ford. Admittedly, my source was second-hand, a regimental commander in the Michigan Brigade passing along a conversation he had with Wyndham. Still, I found the timing of the account persuasive, as the officer recounted his conversation in a letter dated March 14, three days before the fight. As the officer explained, Heintzelman, seeing the merit in Wyndham’s plan, ordered the brigade to take the field prior to receiving a response from Hooker. In the end, Hooker refused “to have anything to do with it.” As I wrote at the time, “The Wolverines took the news with ‘very bad grace, as we thought we could have cut up [Stuart].’” Last year, I found Wyndham’s actual proposal, which he wrote on March 14 and sent directly to Hooker.
“I…suggest the following plan of a raid [emphasis in original], for the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac. A portion of Stuart’s cavalry, not exceeding 3,500 men are scattered over the country between the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers, their headquarters being Culpeper CH, Richardsville and Stevensburg. They could be successfully attacked and a large number captured by the following plan.
“From Hartwood Church, some seven or nine thousand cavalry, divided in three columns, each having one or two light pieces of artillery to move, so as to arrive at three different designated fords, between the mouth of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Station, at the same hour, probably 4:00 a.m.
“The extreme left column, not less than 3,000 strong should march through Stevensburg, following the road toward Waylandsburg and destroy the railroad south of Culpeper, and if it were learned that no strong force of infantry were at Rapidan Station, to move on that place and destroy the important railway bridge there. The right and centre columns should move by different roads on to Culpeper. I would, with two or three thousand men, march from Fairfax CH, passing through Warrenton and following the Sperryville road and come down on Culpeper from the other side.
“It should be arraigned that I could leave Warrenton at the same hour that the forces leave Hartwood. I should necessarily be the first to arrive at Culpeper CH, driving the enemy back on your columns. It would be necessary for the columns on the left to march rapidly in order to reach the railway in time.”
Finding Wyndham’s proposal suggests going down the winding road of ‘what ifs,’ which I won’t do, though the ‘what ifs’ appear tantalizing. Years ago, I assumed that Hooker turned down Wyndham’s proposal strictly for territorial reasons. He had formed the Cavalry Corps, and he intended to not only bend the troopers to his will, but he also had no intention of allowing anyone else to share the glory his men might gain. Now, with more contemporary evidence at hand, Hooker simply did not have the 7,000 to 9,000 men Wyndham proposed to employ for the expedition. But Wyndham could have brought two more brigades to bolster Averell’s force.
Still, consider what did happen. Averell, with a single column of cavalry left 900 men, nearly a third of his total force, to guard his rear. As he explained, his orders had been accompanied by other reports referring to a force of between 250 and 1,000 enemy cavalry “in the vicinity of Brentsville.” Yager had reported 80 to 100 men. In order to counter that force and to protect his rear, Averell had requested one regiment be sent to Catlett Station, to watch the fords nearby and the area between Warrenton and Brentsville. Hooker denied his request, telling Averell that he had “a sufficient force for all purposes.”
In May, following the Stoneman Raid and when Hooker had even more reason to be upset with Averell, the army commander wrote of Averell’s decision at Kelly’s Ford, “He was sent to perform a certain duty, and failed to accomplish it from imaginary apprehensions.” Had Hooker agreed to accept even a small force from Wyndham, the men may well have cleared out the enemy troopers in Prince William and Fauquier Counties and then been in position to cover Averell’s route back to the Rappahannock River, allowing him to advance with his entire force. I think Hooker’s pride played as much of a role in the outcome as Averell’s caution.
Sources:
Unpublished documents from the National Archives
Ebenezer Gould to Dear Brother, March 14, 1863, Clarke Historical Library, Central Michigan University
The Official Records
Edwin Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War
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