Several months ago, while pondering ideas for future posts, I re-read three reports in my files, all dated March 1, 1863, and all three describing, in some detail, the Union cavalry picket line around the Army of the Potomac. I have other reports from the same general time frame, but finding three written by different officers on the same day struck me as an opportunity. Each of the three men identified specific locations along the line, addressed the length of the line, and each mentioned the difficulty of delivering sufficient forage to the horses along the line. Looking further, I found another report written three weeks earlier providing similar details. Common themes in the reports led me to revisit some of the logistical challenges facing the cavalry that winter in last month’s post. Today I offer the reports and further examine the challenges the cavalry faced in trying to secure the army while keeping the horses healthy and serviceable.
Last month’s introduction also provided me an opportunity to use a map that Julie Krick had created for me for another project. She then helped me create a new map for this month’s post. The map needs some explanation, however. I started by gathering all of the locations mentioned in the four reports, homes, churches, mills, creeks, fords, and roads. I then searched wartime maps to try and locate the locations, with homes being the most difficult. For example, officers writing their reports and engineers constructing their maps generally identified homes by the last name of the owner, such as Moncure, but multiple homes in rather close proximity are identified by the same name. Identifying which Moncure home is mentioned in a report could not be done with certainty. Thus, the Moncure home does not appear on the map. Several other locations have disappeared without a trace, including locations now within the Quantico Marine Corps base. We have located these sites as accurately as possible, based on available evidence.
Roads named in the reports appear to have changed little over the years and routes described are rather easily traced on modern maps. I included several roads but not all as I did not want to present an overly cluttered map. Readers should also recognize that locations identified in the reports almost certainly represent reserve posts within the picket line, rather than the extreme outer edge of the line nearest to the Confederate pickets.
Most of the specific locations in the reports are in the northern half of the map. I added several in the southern half as a means of balancing the map, but also to show some locations mentioned in earlier posts on events in King George County, including one here. The February 25 fight around Hartwood Church probably explains the focus on the northern end of the line and some of the shifting of the line in the aftermath of the embarrassing Union defeat. You can find my discussions on picket duty around the church here and here.
These explanations aside, I decided to show the picket line in a rather general sense, a smooth line rather than a jagged line moving up and down across its length. We should keep in mind that the line was in constant flux as events dictated. This will be more evident in next month’s post when I look at one section of the northern end in detail, but in this expansive view the jagged lines fade into a smoother line. The map depicts the probable outer edge of the line. The northern border is the most difficult to pin down for any one date and is possibly a little too far to the north. The line along the river is firm, and the line to the south is pretty firm, as other information suggests the pickets used modern day Rt. 301 as a border. None of the sketches mentioned by the officers have been found.
I believe generals Warren and Stoneman each offer their comments from a different perspective, Warren as he faced the Rappahannock and Stoneman as he faced the Potomac. Thus, Warren’s left is Stoneman’s right. I also had difficulty locating Machodoc Creek (which Warren badly misspells) initially. Nor did I realize there was a small town known as Port Tobacco on the Virginia side of the river at the time. These two locations are marked on an updated version of the map in my concluding post next month.
I hope the map is helpful as you read the following descriptions of the Union picket line. I want to thank Julie Krick and her husband Bob for their help, along with John Hennessy and Jim McLain who provided copies of additional maps that proved helpful in creating this map.
***
In a report to army headquarters on February 8, 1863, Gen. Gouverneur Warren, General Hooker’s Chief Topographical Engineer, described the picket line thusly:
“From an examination of the reports and rough sketches sent in, I find that our cavalry picket line (beginning on the left) extends from a point on the Potomac River, near the mouth of [Machodoc] Creek across the peninsula to the Rappahannock, at a point opposite Port Tobacco, some three miles below Port Royal; thence up the Rappahannock to where the Infantry picket line leaves it, which is about 5 miles below Falmouth.
“The whole of this distance is about 35 miles. The first 15 miles below the Infantry is picketed by the cavalry of the Left Grand Div. (Gen. Gregg’s) The remainder by Col. Gamble’s brigade & Gen. Pleasonton’s Division. Gen. Pleasonton’s Cavalry again take up the line on the Rappahannock above the Infantry picket, at Bank’s Ford, & watch the whole line of the river up to Richard’s Ford, a distance of 8 to 10 miles, & thence to Hartwood Church, about 4 miles from the river. From Hartwood Church along the road to Stafford Court House, to the cross roads at Moncure’s new house, a distance of 5 or 6 miles, is picketed by Gen. Averell’s Cavalry. Thence to the right, the Cavalry pickets are from Gen. Sigel’s Cavalry, the location & extent of which are not reported. Sigel’s Cavalry at Alcott’s seems to be out of place & unnecessarily distant from its supply of forage.”
In one of the March 1 reports, General Pleasonton writes:
“A report from Major [Peter] Keenan, 8th PA commanding pickets [at] Chopawamsic Church, states, that on the morning of [February 26] at daylight the outpost on the road leading from Dumfries to Barnett’s Ford about a mile & a half from Stafford Springs, was attacked by a small party of rebel cavalry…
“Major Keenan reports his horses are starving – there is no forage in the country & it is impossible [Pleasonton’s emphasis]to pack it out, the roads are so bad & the streams so high. These pickets belong to the 2nd Brigade. I passed over that picket line on Thursday last & I am satisfied that the Major’s report is correct.
“Colonel [Benjamin] Davis commanding 1st Brigade reports nothing of importance along his picket line – he states the forage in the section of country in which he is picketing is almost entirely exhausted & requests that his picket line may be supplied with forage & rations from Dumfries. This is absolutely necessary if the present picket line is to be maintained, it being impracticable to supply that line from here.
“The picket lines of both brigades can be supplied from Dumfries & it is … recommended that this be done…the brigades have not been able to collect three days supplies in their camps from the depot, although but a mile & a half from it – such is the bad condition of the country around Aquia…”
Prior to sending the report on to army headquarters, General Stoneman added, “I would suggest that until the roads get better the line of cavalry videttes be drawn in commencing on the left at the mouth of Rock Pen Creek [Rocky Pen Run] thence to near Hughes House holding the junction of the Warrenton and Poplar Roads, thence to “Guy’s Old Tavern” thence to Garrisonville and from there northward and two or three miles in front of Dumfries…”
Other reports suggest that the line was pulled back roughly as Stoneman’s requests in the area around Hartwood Church, at least temporarily, but then rather quickly advanced again to include the Alcock property.
Stoneman then mentioned the idea of relying upon pack mules rather than wagons to supply the men and horses on the picket line. “As soon as the pack saddles arrive…and the pack trains can be organized, forage can be packed out to the animals.” Stoneman then explained that he had sent his pickets into King George County, not only for reasons of security but also “to ascertain if there was forage to be obtained in that region.”
Though he accepted Stoneman’s suggestions, Hooker directed that if Stoneman contracted the line, he should send out “patrols on all the main approaches…sufficiently often to be well informed of any movement or approach of the enemy.” In either event, the cavalry horses received little rest during the hardest part of the winter.
Gen. William Averell, commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division, also sent a report to Stoneman’s headquarters on March 1. Averell’s men had taken the brunt of the Southern attack at Hartwood Church, as well as the lion’s share of the blame for the embarrassing defeat.
“I…proffer the following requests with regard to the pickets from this division and to ask [Stoneman’s] favorable consideration …
“1st That two regiments of infantry be advanced, one to Beria Church and the other to Wallace’s with outposts on all the avenues approaching the line, for the … security of the line, and in order to make it possible to withdraw a portion of the cavalry force now engaged on picket duty.
“With regard to the first reason, I think it is obvious that a small infantry force, well posted and protected by a temporary abattis, can successfully resist the advance of almost any attacking cavalry force of the enemy, and at the same time be as comfortably encamped and supplied, as in their present camps. The outposts could be connected by cavalry videttes and small parties of cavalry scouting constantly beyond the lines could give the infantry timely warning of the approach of an enemy.
“Concerning the second reason… the duty of guarding eighteen miles of picket line in a thickly wooded country, is too onerous for the force of this division to perform properly and keep the horses in serviceable condition. But a short time must now elapse before active operations may be expected to begin; that time will probably be too brief to restore the horses of my division to a good serviceable condition even should they all be relieved from picket duty. The conjunction of infantry would enable me to withdraw one half, or two thirds of the force now engaged.
“2nd Should the first request not meet with a favorable consideration, I have to ask that the line may be withdrawn and re-established on a line parallel with the line of infantry pickets and only two miles in advance of them, instead of four or five as at present. The line of infantry pickets is now well established and defensible: light cavalry pickets a mile and a half or two miles in front of it, with scouting parties farther out, would give it sufficient notice of any threatening force and enable me to withdraw one third of the force now engaged on picket duty. We ought either to hold our present line or abandon it. It is too remote from infantry support, and too extended to be abandoned during an attack [Averell’s emphasis] without disorder, and disaster. My first request granted would hold the line; my second would establish a new one, from which the cavalry if forced to retire could preserve their connections and save themselves from disorder and disgrace.”
I should note here that I do not have, nor have I sought out the same details on the infantry portions of the picket line.
Capt. Charles Adams, 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, had inspected the 1st Cavalry Division line on February 28 and he made his report on March 1.
“…The country now covered by our pickets, from a point near Bank’s Ford to Aquia Creek, is some eighteen miles in extent – to visit the whole of this line an officer must retrace his steps over some five miles, from the picket reserve to Bank’s Ford, which will make a total distance in going, inspecting & returning of not much less than forty miles for each daily inspection, & this in the worst & heaviest woods in Virginia…
“The picket lines in the neighborhood of Hartwood Church I found altered & drawn in as follows – all our pickets are drawn in from the large plain opposite the church & our line now runs from the [Halstead House], & the intersection of the Poplar and Stafford Court House road, along the Poplar road to its intersection with the Telegraph and Falmouth road; from that point it bears almost southerly, & in nearly a direct line to Benson’s Mills & from Benson’s Mills it runs in a south easterly direction to a point of [intersection] near the Rappahannock & about three quarters of a mile below Bank’s Ford.” In reference to Poplar road, I believe Adams describes what is today a combination of both Poplar road and Truslow road.
“That portion of the line extending from the Telegraph road to the river was yesterday drawn in & picketed anew by Lt. Col. [John] Thompson, [1st Rhode Island Cavalry]. I accompanied him over his line & carefully examined it. The reports of my predecessors & personal examination must have fully acquainted the general commanding with the [issues] & adaptation of this portion of our lines to picket duty. I do not know that Lt. Col. Thompson’s line can be improved, but, situated as it is, far from any reserves or force & intersecting a wholly independent collection of roads, I have no doubt that it can be cut at any one of a dozen points, that it has little if any power of resistance against large bodies, & from necessity is so much spread out that, while individual videttes are greatly exposed, a very [unreadable] barrier is made, at [unreadable] cost of labor & horse flesh, against the incursions of the enemies scouts & small scouting parties. This portion of our line of pickets is, & from necessity must be, as long as it is maintained, not a line of pickets proper, with a system of reserves, outposts & videttes, all furnishing mutual support & intelligence, but it is a long, unconnected line of outlying sentries, with different lines of retreat for various emergencies, posted amid thick wood, full of roads, in a very rolling country & with minimal supports. Such is this portion of our line as it now exists & such it must continue to be as long as it is nominally picketed by cavalry alone. The disposition of the forces on the remainder of the line has not been altered…”
After addressing some other concerns, Adams added, “I must take the liberty of calling the attention of the commanding general to the condition of the horses now required to do double picket duty, on insufficient forage, in the presence of an active enemy and in Virginia March mud. Of the horses yesterday on post & in the reserves, at the very smallest — one half should now be in camp & daily reported as unserviceable. These horses are unserviceable, either as being in a greater or less degree unshod, or too weak from severe duty, great exposure & insufficient forage for such continued & hard duty. The danger & [impolicy] of sending such horses out to perform picket duty was strongly illustrated in the affair of last Wednesday [the Hartwood Church fight]. It was my fortune by mere accident to take part in that affair …and I was impressed by nothing more than the impossibility of handling the men effectually, because of the weakness of their horses. They could run away in a rush, but they could not be moved with any spirit or affect. It was most evident that their whole power in many cases was expended in dragging themselves along through the mud. That such horses should be posted on a line of pickets such as ours, where speed & strength are the two essentials, where the distances are great & the roads well-nigh impassable, indicated a defective system on the part of the regimental & line officers to which I would most respectfully call the commanding officer’s attention.”
Several themes appear in each report to some degree, including the length of the line, the difficult terrain, the execrable condition of the roads, the inability to reliably deliver supplies, including food and fodder to the picket posts, and the toll the duty and corresponding lack of food took on the horses.
Last month, I discussed the challenge of delivering hay from the depots in Philadelphia, Baltimore and Alexandria to Aquia and Belle Plain. Now, the challenge lay in trying to deliver hay from Aquia and Belle Plain to the picket posts. And because those depots now appear to have an adequate supply, the urgency expressed by Colonel Ingalls in last month’s post is not as apparent in the message traffic from late February and early March. Instead, the concern shifts to bringing mules to the depots and establishing pack trains to deliver the hay to the front line. I have previously examined the pack trains in some detail here and here. Rather than discussing the origin of the pack train again, I want to examine the toll picket duty took on the horses and mules.
On December 22, 1862, Col. Daniel Rucker, commanding the depot in Washington, and, arguably, the man most directly responsible for supplying horses to the army, had crafted a detailed report for General Meigs regarding the number of unserviceable horses being returned to the capital. As with the previous reports, I believe Rucker’s report to be worth including with only minor edits.
“… a very large number of unserviceable horses have been turned into this Dept. from [the army] within the past few months. I have caused an inquiry to be made relative to the number turned in since Sept. 1, 1862, the number returned to duty and the probable cause which rendered these animals unserviceable. I find that from 1 September to December 18, 1862, … [11,811 unserviceable horses have been turned in to this depot], averaging about 109 horses daily. During the same period there have been returned to duty fit for service … 5,701 horses, averaging about 53 daily. [2,834 unserviceable horses have died or been ordered to be shot by inspectors], a daily average of about 26.” The army put these animals down either because they had been deemed beyond hope of recovery or to prevent the spread of a contagious disease.
Rucker continued, “Until recently the extent of stable room has been insufficient to accommodate, except partially, the very large number of horses which have been sent here and many of them were consequently out of doors whose lives might perhaps have been prolonged under cover. We now have or shall have within a few days stabling sufficient for about 2700 horses requiring medical treatment, leaving about 650 without shelter.”
The animals with the army almost certainly had no cover from the elements. The large number of animals required for daily duty along the picket line, where they had no shelter, probably made construction of shelters around the camps, where the horses spent little time, seem unreasonable. At the reserve posts near the front, the men took shelter in churches, barns and mills and sometimes brought their animals inside as well.
Readers may condemn the army for the reported lack of shelters in Washington but recall the explosion in the number of animals reaching the army. Trying to anticipate such growth would have been difficult, if not impossible, as would any attempt to provide shelter for the expanding herd. The army constructed the massive Cavalry Depot in Washington, that opened in January 1864, as a means of answering such concerns.
Rucker then told Meigs, “The horses used in the teams of this Department have been furnished exclusively from those turned into this depot and which have been…recruited.” The decision to return rehabilitated animals to duty with the quartermaster, pulling wagons, seems at first glance to have been wise. However, once good roads deteriorated in the winter, these animals probably broke down again very quickly.
Continuing, Rucker noted, “A portion of the horses turned in… are [infected] with diseases beyond the control of those who had them in charge; by far the larger proportion however, are rendered unserviceable in my opinion by hard and improper riding and want of proper attention and by disease arising from neglect and ill treatment… which might have been prevented by proper care, there are also occasional cases where improper medicines have been administered.
“By the extension of our hospital stables we are endeavoring to give as many horses as practicable the advantage of protection from the weather while under treatment but in view of the immense number turned in, it will be impracticable to care for all of them and unless more careful treatment can be exacted from those parties who have them in use previous to their arrival here, this great and necessary mortality of horses will continue…”
While Rucker spoke of facilities in the capital, corrals or dismount camps, had also been constructed near the Army of the Potomac, from where fresh horses could be distributed to men in need of them, where horses in need of rehabilitation could be collected prior to being sent back to Washington, and where horses determined to have a contagious disease could be isolated. While I do not know specific locations or exactly when they opened, the army established these camps near Dumfries, Stafford Court House and Hope Landing in Stafford. My thanks again to Julie Krick for the map below.
As mentioned in Part 1, the army had counted 37,897 animals on November 1, 62,330 on January 1, and 63,193 on January 26. One sees just how quickly the numbers grew. As Ingalls told Meigs, “The number of animals is much larger, probably, than you supposed. There have been great additions to the cavalry and artillery horses.” Indeed, entire new regiments had recently reached the army. Ingalls also cited the creation of the pontoon train since his previous report, as well as the need to increase wagon teams from four to six animals, as factors contributing to the growth.
Ingalls judged the cavalry and artillery horses to be in “fair condition, considering that the quality of the animals was never first-rate.” He believed that “First-class horses have never yet found their way into this arm,” and he suspected that contractors “doctored up” the animals before selling them to the army. I also think it fair to conclude that the condition of the animals, doctored or not, continued to deteriorate from the moment they reached the front lines. In a slightly harsher assessment, Colonel Rucker had recently judged a shipment of animals from Indianapolis as “of a very inferior quality…most were thin and some undersize, and [with but one exception] they are the most inferior horses yet brought to this depot.[8]
After reading Ingalls’ report, Meigs added, “It grows more difficult to supply forage, and the waste of animals is now great. This Department is very much in debt, and prices are rising.”
By way of a specific example, General Pleasonton had inspected the 9th New York Cavalry on December 24, when he found 520 men present for duty but just 392 horses, “of which number 90 may be considered fit for ordinary use – the rest are broken down from hard usage & want of food.” In other words, the regiment had but 90 healthy horses for 520 men.
Continuing, Pleasonton noted, “There is no appearance of disease among these horses & some of them with care may be fit for service in the spring, but the remainder are used up. These horses, the commanding officer reported had been condemned several times & the papers sent forward without other result. I have brought this regiment within half a mile of the depot to feed the horses, as they are not able to pack the forage to camp beyond.”
In another example, nearly one month after the battle at Fredericksburg and prior to the Mud March, Gen. William Franklin’s Left Grand Division alone needed 650 artillery horses. Had Franklin’s artillery contingent lost 650 horses in battle, did the number represent non-battle losses during the weeks after the fighting, or did the number represent a combination of both? I suspect we will never know, though dragging cannons, caissons, limbers, and other attached equipment through mud would quickly exhaust the animals.
In early December, Ingalls had directed that a railroad siding be constructed near one of the main cavalry encampments about five miles up the rail line from Aquia Landing. The area had already been graded when Ingalls made his request and in a matter of days the station known as Stoneman’s Switch or Station became operational. The new station immediately facilitated delivery of hay to the cavalry camps along the line and saved some wagon traffic on the nearby roads. Though placed near the mid-point of the picket line, the station still lay 10-20 miles as the crow flies from the outer pickets to the north and south. In order to supply his men north of the station, General Averell directed on January 22, that all “available mounted men without arms and the pack mules to report at once to … Stoneman’s Switch for the purpose of carrying out rations to the troops at the front, the roads being such as to preclude wagons from transporting them, 50lbs. to be carried to each horse…” Averell’s solution, probably made as a matter of desperation, meant that few men or animals in his division received any rest until the roads improved, as the men not on picket or patrol duty brought supplies to those on the line.
The lack of unsaddled recuperative time, as well as the exertion expended carrying or pulling any weight through heavy mud, certainly took a toll on the animals. On February 19, Pleasonton reported, “The wagons of the regiments that have arrived are stuck in the mud on the different roads to the old camps – The troops here are packing their supplies on their horses to their camp – but the roads are so execrable that we shall lose a great number. It will not be possible to get hay to the horses on the picket line, & at present the troops in camp cannot get it, although the supply at the depot is ample – for it takes all day to make one trip for provisions & short forage.”
The same day, Colonel Ingalls summarized the earlier problems encountered delivering hay to the army. “Our outstanding contracts cover 50 days’ supply of good timothy hay. There has been enough in the markets, but we have been deficient recently – 1st because the very rough weather has dispersed the transports, over 3,000 tons being afloat – 2nd the scarcity of vessels…” Ingalls also cited a rise in freight costs and the manner in which the government paid contractors as other factors contributing to delays. He then assured his superiors, “The obstacles are now removed to a great extent. We are receiving full allowances of hay and grain. I anticipate no failure hereafter.” With a few exceptions, the record appears to corroborate that most of the problems encountered getting hay to Aquia and Belle Plain had been overcome.
Even if the upper end of the supply chain now seemed to work smoothly, other problems created delays at the lower end of the chain, as needed supplies could not be delivered dependably from Aquia and Belle Plain to the men and animals at the front. Seeking a solution, Ingalls pressed for additional mules, but Rucker had none to send, without pulling them from his own teams. Doing so would have impaired his ability to deliver goods from the Washington and Alexandria depots to the docks. The best Rucker could offer was an expected delivery of 2,000 mules in 10 to 14 days. Ingalls also noted the loss of “some artillery horses from the effect of” a recent storm and asked for 300 artillery horses as replacements. Losing horses in such numbers when the army was generally stationary is instructive, though I wish Ingalls had provided more details.
On March 3, and with the roads still impassable, Ingalls again pressed Rucker to break up his own teams in order to send him 2,000 mules. Ingalls did so even though he must have understood the problems doing so would create at Rucker’s end of the line. Ingalls then added, “The other corps will require more [mules] as soon as you can supply them.” Rucker promised to send 600 the next day and as many as 900 on March 5. At the going rate of $112 per mule, the promised delivery of 1,500 mules cost $168,000. At the same time, an order for 5,000 tons of hay cost $140,250 and 20,000 bushels of oats cost $18,000. But even as the mules began arriving, the necessary pack saddles and leather gear would be several more days in transit. Further, men had to be pulled from the ranks, assigned to the regimental pack teams and trained to properly load the mules. Each regiment appears to have been authorized 66 mules.
Although history lauds the hardy mule as an effective alternative to horses and wagons in bad weather, one report suggests that Mother Nature often defeated the mules. On February 25, Pleasonton told Stoneman, “Eight of the pack mules sent to the pickets of the 1st Brigade with supplies gave out on the road; only 1.5 day’s rations reached the pickets – less than one day’s forage. This was the best that could be done, for the wagons of the regiment that marched from Belle Plain have not all left that point inconsequence of the deep mud and our number of packs is limited in consequence.”
Ingalls also needed “500 Negroes for laborers and teamsters.” With no one apparently available at the contraband camp at Ft. Monroe, Ingalls sent a ship to the camps at New Bern, North Carolina. Further, he needed to ship 11,000 sick and wounded men from hospitals near the army to facilities around Washington. The necessary shipping and the time needed to load the patients impacted the ability of supply ships to reach the docks at Aquia and Belle Plain and unload cargo needed by the healthy men and animals.
Recognizing a need to provide for the medical needs of his animals as well as his men, Gen. Joseph Hooker, who had recently taken command of the Army of the Potomac, sent his veterinary surgeon to inspect the public horses in the army (officers purchased their horses privately) on February 10. Hooker authorized him “to give such directions for the treatment of diseases among [the animals] as may be necessary and in the cases of public horses affected with glanders he is authorized to order them to be shot. All [quartermasters and officers of artillery and cavalry] will afford him every facility.”
Though references to veterinary surgeons are found earlier, the War Department did not officially authorize the position until two weeks after Hooker’s order. Each regiment could assign one man, with the rank of sergeant major but who received the pay of a 1st lieutenant, to serve as a veterinary surgeon. Still, some viewed these men as “Quacks,” as evidenced in a letter to the secretary of war in mid-December. Clearly, the men would meet resistance, as supporters of home remedies encountered academically trained men with conflicting ideas. Meigs professed little confidence that “graduates of veterinary colleges can be found in this country in sufficient numbers to supply the number needed in the present military establishment,” and he suggested leaving their selection to regimental commanders.
The timing may have been coincidental, but I suspect that the staggering numbers of sick or exhausted animals returning to Washington, as well as the escalating monetary burden on the national treasury, forced the decision.
To be continued…
Sources:
Documents from the National Archives
Paula Whitacre, “A Staggering Burden, Veterinary Medicine During the Civil War,” Journal of the National Museum of Civil War Medicine, Vol. 24, 2019
Small But Important Riots 